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1. Introduction 
According to "standard" or "classical" Bayesian confirmation theory, a piece 
of evidence E confirms a theory or hypothesis T, for a given person, if and only 
if Pr(T IE) > Pr('/), where Pr is the relevant person's subjective (personal) prob-
ability function, representing this individual's degrees of belief. Pr(T I E) is the 
individual's probability for Tconditional on E, Pr(T&E) I Pr(E), which Bayesians 
argue is equal to the degree of confidence the individual should have in T if, and 
after, Eis learned. In defenses and further "articulations" of this theory, Bayes-
ians have assumed that these "rational degrees of belief' satisfy the standard prob-
ability axioms, where the appropriateness of this assumption has been defended 
in various ways, including "Dutch book" and decision theoretical approaches. 1 
Clark Glymour (1980, 85-93) has recently raised an interesting problem for 
this theory. It is not uncommon for scientists to find support for a theory in evi-
dence known long before the theory was even introduced, so that, intuitively, 
there are cases of already known, or "old," evidence confirming "new" theories 
or hypotheses. Glymour cites the examples of the support for Copernicus' theory 
derived from previous astronomical observations, the support for Newton's the-
ory of gravitation derived from the already established second and third laws of 
Kepler, and the support for Einstein's gravitational field equations derived from 
the already known anomalous advance of the perihelion of Mercury. But if evi-
dence E is already known before theory or hypothesis Tis invented, then Pr(E) 
already equals 1 at that later time, so that, at that later time, Pr(T IE) must equal 
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Pr(T); this follows from the usual axioms of probability and the definition of Pr(T 
IE). Thus, Bayesian confirmation theory seems to imply that already known evi-
dence cannot support newly invented theories, contrary to what seems true in the 
cases Glymour cites. 
After some further clarification of this problem for Bayesian confirmation the-
ory in section 2 below-which will help isolate the version of the problem of old 
evidence that poses the most potent threat to the theory- I shall in section 3 con-
sider the principal line of defense that has been offered in support of Bayesian con-
firmation theory in light of the problem. I believe that the general idea embodied 
in such responses is sound. Roughly, the strategy is: (1) to suppose, contrary to 
standard or classical Bayesianism, that rational scientists are not "logically omni-
scient" at all times over the set of propositions entertained (as explained below), 
and then, (2) to argue that, in cases of the kind Glymour cites, there really is new 
evidence, namely, the discovery of some logical relation between E and T (which 
relation might suggest, for example, that the truth of Twould explain E). In sec-
tions 4 and 5, however, I will argue that the ways in which the two components 
of this strategy have been developed are not adequate, and I will suggest more 
promising ways of developing them. 
2. Clarification of the Problem 
Based on a suggestion by Brian Skyrms, Daniel Garber (1983) has suggested 
that there is an ambiguity in Glymour's problem, and Garber divides the problem 
into two separate problems, which he calls the "historical" and "ahistorical" prob-
lems of old evidence. Garber argues (quickly) that his ahistorical problem can be 
solved by means of some variant of what he calls a "counterfactual strategy." This 
strategy has also been discussed, and criticized, by Glymour (1980); the strategy 
and some of its difficulties will be briefly described later in this section. Since I 
wish to avoid this strategy, I shall here segment the problem somewhat differ-
ently, in a way that I think will allow for more plausible "quick" resolutions of 
several of its variants. Below I'll also describe the relation between my way of 
dividing up the problem and Garber's. 
In all versions of the problem to be described, with two exceptions to be noted 
later, I shall assume that the correct assessment of the relation between the evi-
dence E and theory or hypothesis T in question is that E is in fact positively 
evidentially relevant to T. (I hope that the rationale for the perhaps somewhat 
awkward terminology I shall employ for labeling the three main problems I shall 
distinguish will become evident as the discussion unfolds; also, see the outline 
below.) What I shall call "The Problem Of Old New Evidence" arises in cases in 
which one first formulates a theory or hypothesis T and subsequently discovers 
evidence E, which is thus "new" in relation to the time of the formulation of T. 
In cases of the problem of this first kind, at the point in time at which Eis learned, 
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Ein fact does increase one's confidence in T. However, later on, whenEbecomes 
"old" in relation to the time of its discovery, E can no longer thus increase one's 
confidence in T. Nevertheless, there seems to be a valid sense in which Eis still 
good evidence for T. So, at such later times, E would, in this sense, seem to 
confirm T - it is in this sense still good evidence for T -even though Pr(T I E) 
= Pr('!) so that the Bayesian theory says that E does not confirm T. 
What I shall call (henceforth) simply "The Problem Of Old Evidence" arises 
in cases in which E is learned first, and Tis formulated subsequent to the learning 
of E. This problem can be subdivided in turn. "The Problem Of Old Old Evi-
dence" arises at times after the formulation of T: if E somehow confirmed Tat 
or around the time of the formulation of T (even if E had probability 1 at or around 
the time of the formulation of 'I), then it would seem that, even later on, Eis still, 
in a valid sense, good evidence for T. And "The Problem Of New Old Evidence" 
concerns how, at the time of the formulation of T, E can confirm T even though 
E already had subjective probability 1. Finally, it will be helpful to divide each 
of these latter two problems into two cases. In Case 1, Twas specifically designed 
to explain E; and in Case 2, it was not. 
For easier reference, here in outline form are the versions of Glymour's prob-
lem to be discussed: 2 
I. The Problem of Old New Evidence: Tformulated before the discovery 
of E; but it is now later and Pr(E) = 1, so that Pr(T I E) = Pr(T) 
II. The Problem of Old Evidence: E known before the formulation of T 
A. The Problem of Old Old Evidence: It is now some time subse-
quent to the formulation of T. 
1. T originally designed to explain E 
2. T not originally designed to explain E 
B. The Problem of New Old Evidence: It is now the time (or barely 
after it) of the formulation of T 
1. T originally designed to explain E 
2. T not originally designed to explain E 
Garber's ahistorical problem of old evidence, as I understand it, arises in cases 
I and IIA above, and the historical problem arises in case IIB. Roughly, the coun-
terfactual strategy endorsed by Garber is to argue that, in cases I and IIA, if, now 
(sometime after both the discovery of E and the formulation of T), we had not 
known E (e.g., if our education in the history of science had been incomplete), 
then the probability Pr(T IE) would have been greater than the probability Pr(T). 
Thus, on the modification of Bayesian confirmation theory suggested by Garber, 
appeal is made to counterfactual degrees of belief 
Garber admits that there are "some details to be worked out here" (1983, 103), 
and, as noted above, Glymour (1980) has criticized the strategy. For example, 
Glymour and Garber both point out that there will not necessarily be any particu-
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lar degrees of belief that we can say a person would have had in E, or in T given 
E, if this person's degree of belief in E had been less than 1. Indeed, it seems plau-
sible that in some cases T would not even have been formulated had E not been 
learned. And surely there also will be cases in which the person's knowledge of 
E saved his life at some time in the past, so that had the individual's degree of 
belief in E been less than 1, the person would be dead now. Also, there are of 
course the well-known difficulties attending the proper interpretation of counter-
factual conditionals that would befall any such modification of Bayesian con-
firmation theory. 
Brian Skyrms (1983) has discussed ways of "giving a probability assignment 
a memory," so that one may, in one way or another, retain information about 
one's old actual degrees of belief in E, and in T given E. This kind of approach 
is more promising, I think, and it is closer to the approach I shall describe below. 
To apply this kind of approach, however, it is necessary first to divide Garber's 
ahistorical problem into problems I and TIA above, for such an approach works 
only for the first of these. 
The problem of old new evidence (problem I) can be handled quite plausibly, 
I think, as follows. One of the central tenets of Bayesian confirmation theory is 
that confirmation is a relation between three things: a piece of evidence, a 
hypothesis or theory, and a set of background beliefs. As background beliefs 
change over time (as well as from person to person), so does what confirms 
what-where, of course, our background beliefs, of various degrees, are given 
by our subjective probability assignment. At the time (or just before) E was 
learned, E was not one of our background beliefs of degree 1. At that time-that 
is, relative to the set of background beliefs that includes E only to some intermedi-
ate degree-our degree of belief in Tis less than our degree of belief in T condi-
tional on E, so that at that time, E does confirm T according to the Bayesian the-
ory. However, after Eis learned, and we face problem I above, our background 
beliefs have changed. At this time-that is, relative to the new set of background 
beliefs-E (or being again told that E, or pondering the discovery of E) can no 
longer increase our degree of confidence in T; although it did so once, it cannot 
do so again. I think it is quite natural to say simply that, because of the change 
in our background beliefs, E simply does not confirm Tat the later time, after 
its evidential impact on T has already been "absorbed." The Bayesian theory of 
confirmation was designed to reflect this possibility: what confirms what, depends 
on one's background beliefs. What now remains to be explicated in Bayesian 
terms, however, is that sense in which E may remain good evidence for T. 
I think it is good idea to distinguish Es actually confirming T from Es being 
(actual) evidence in favor of T, as follows. Recall that Bayesian confirmation is 
a relation that obtains between evidence E, theory or hypothesis T, and degrees 
of belief Pr if and only if Pr(T I E) > Pr(T). Whether or not this relation obtains 
is independent of whether or not T ever actually gets confirmed: the relation may 
BAYESIAN PROBLEMS OF OLD EVIDENCE 209 
obtain, or not, independently of whether or not E will ever get discovered. But 
we may say that actual confirmation is an event, involving E, T, and a person with 
a subjective probability assignment Pr, that takes place when the three-part rela-
tion Pr(T I E) > Pr('/) obtains and E is learned. In cases of the problem of old 
new evidence, such an event happened in the past, once, and it cannot recur (with 
the same piece of evidence and the same ideal Bayesian agent). As to the second 
idea, it seems appropriate to say that Eis (actual) evidence for T, for a given in-
dividual, if, at some time in the past, the event of its confirming T, for that in-
dividual, took place. Indeed, this seems to be exactly what it means for E to con-
stitute part of our current body of evidence for T: at some time in the past E raised 
our rational degree of confidence in T. In cases of the problem of old new evi-
dence, therefore, it is clearly consistent and appropriate to say both that E 
confirmed T but no longer does and that E is now, but before its discovery was 
not, part of our body of evidence in favor of T. 
To be more precise about the idea of Es being evidence for T, we have to say 
that it is a relation that may obtain among four things: (1) a piece of evidence, 
(2) a hypothesis or theory, (3) a time, and (4) a history of a set of background 
beliefs (i.e., a sequence of subjective probability functions indexed by times). 
Roughly: Eis, at time t, part of the body of evidence in favor of theory Trelative 
to history H of background beliefs if and only if, at some time prior to t in the 
history H (of a set of background beliefs), the confirmation event took place be-
tween E, T, and the state of H (the relevant probability assignment) at that earlier 
time. Relativity to a history of a set of background beliefs is essential. For it is 
not difficult to invent cases (or find actual cases) in which, relative to one history, 
E is now evidence for T, but, relative to an alternative history, E is now evidence 
against T(i.e.,for -T). For example, if initially Pr(T) = 0.5, Pr(TI E) = 0.7, 
Pr(T IF) = 0.9, and Pr(T I E&F) = 0.8, then whether Eis evidence for or 
against Twill depend on whether Eis learned before or after F. Thus the relativity 
of confirmation to a set of background beliefs shows up in this Bayesian concep-
tion of evidence. There is no univocal matter of fact about whether or not an E 
confirms a Tor about whether a known E is evidence for or against a T: the first 
depends on a set of background beliefs, and the second depends also on the history 
of a set of background beliefs. On this conception of confirmation and evidence, 
whether E confirms, disconfirms, or is neutral for T, and whether a known E is 
evidence for, against, or neutral towards T, both involve an element of historical 
accident pertaining to what our background beliefs, and their history, happen to 
be. 
It might be objected that it is inappropriate to let whether or not E is part of 
our body of evidence in favor of T depend on when it was learned in relation to 
other evidence (as in the numerical example above). I am not entirely sympathetic 
(or entirely unsympathetic) with such an objection, but in any case there is a natu-
ral framework in which it can be accommodated (suggested to me by Brian 
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Skyrms in correspondence). Suppose we begin with an initial probability assign-
ment Pro, and as evidence El, E2, . . . , En (n = "now") comes in, we update: 
Pr;+ 1(-) = Pr;(-IE; + 1). Then it is natural to say that E ( = E;, say) is now part 
of our body of evidence in favor of T if Prn(T) = Pro(T I E1 & . . . & En) > 
Pr0(T I E1 & . . . & E; - 1 & E; + 1 & . . . & En). On this explication, whether 
or not Eis part of our body of evidence in favor of T does not depend on the order 
in which the evidence comes in: if we permute the subscripts on the E;s, the ver-
dict remains the same. Note also that the "prior" used need not be actual. 
As to the problem of old evidence (problem II above), I think we can quickly 
dispense with versions Al and Bl. If our knowledge of E inspired and guided our 
formulation of theory T, where the intention was to give an explanation of E, then 
it would seem that E does not confirm Tin the first place, and E does not constitute 
evidence in favor of T. In this case, the Bayesian theory gives the right answer: 
for both IIAl and IIBl, we have Pr(T IE) = Pr(T ). (Compare Garber 1983, 
104.) This is not to say that Tmust be completely without support, however. T 
may derive support from the fact (if it is a fact) that it has some of the virtues 
usually thought to attach to good theories, such as simplicity, analogy with other 
well-confirmed theories, independent evidence, and the very fact (if it is a fact) 
that its truth would successfully explain E, and so on. Indeed, it would seem that 
if Thad none of these virtues, then it would be entirely without support, despite 
the truth of E; therefore, if T does have support, it is not from E itself. 
This leaves problems IIA2 and IIB2. But if problem IIB2 can be solved, so 
can IIA2, by employing the very same considerations employed in resolving 
problem I earlier. If it can be shown, in resolving IIB2, that at the time of the for-
mulation of T, T gets confirmation, in the Bayesian sense, in virtue of some aspect 
of its relation to E, then, for problem IIA2, we should say that whatever exactly 
it was that confirmed Tat the earlier time no longer does so at the later time, even 
though it will still be, in the sense clarified earlier, a part of our body of evidence 
in favor of T. Let us thus turn to problem IIB2. 
3. The Basic Bayesian Defense 
If, in cases of problem IIB2, T does receive confirmation in the Bayesian sense 
explained above, then, when it does, there must be some proposition F such that 
(1) one's subjective probability of F increases from some value short of 1 to 1, 
and (2) the prior probability of Tis less than the posterior probability of T (i.e., 
the prior probability of T conditional on F). For reasons already explained, F can-
not be the same as E. Daniel Garber (1983) and Richard Jeffrey (1983) have re-
cently sought to show how some proposition other than E might plausibly play 
the role of F. 
The total strategy in these defenses involves basically three steps; and the two 
authors concentrate on different steps of the total strategy. First, it is argued that 
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classical Bayesianism's assumption of "logical omniscience" is clearly unrealistic, 
and this first step includes some "nonclassical" formulation of Bayesianism that 
is intended to be more realistic yet at the same time appropriately logically restric-
tive on rational agents' degrees of belief. Classical Bayesianism's assumption of 
logical omniscience may be formulated as follows: All logical truths have subjec-
tive probability 1; and if propositions A and B are logically incompatible, then 
Pr(AvB) = Pr(A) + Pr(B). These two conditions, together with the condition that 
all subjective probabilities are greater than or equal to 0, are just the usual axioms 
of subjective probability theory. Of course, given the "richness" of the languages 
we use, it is very unrealistic to suppose that any rational scientist's degrees of be-
lief will be sensitive to all the logical facts encompassed by these axioms. So it 
is desirable, even independently of the problem Glymour has raised for Bayesian-
ism, to formulate weaker versions of the usual axioms of subjective probability. 
The second step of the total strategy is to describe a logical relation that holds 
between E and T-or between E, T, and others of one's beliefs-whose obtaining 
perhaps suggests that the truth of T (or the truth of Tin the presence of one's back-
ground beliefs) would explain E. It is then argued, in the third step, that it is not 
E itself that confirms Tin cases of problem IIB2, but rather the discovery of this 
logical relation between E and T. That the obtaining of this relation can be discov-
ered, and need not have been known all along, should now be a possibility in light 
of the successful completion of step one of the strategy. Thus, where "Tf-E' ex-
presses the proposition that E and Tare so logically related to each other (and 
perhaps also to one's background beliefs), step one of the strategy makes it theo-
retically possible that Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T). It is the task of step three to argue 
that this inequality should indeed obtain. 
Roughly speaking, Garber focuses on step one, without providing much in the 
way of argument for step three, while Jeffrey concentrates on step three; for vari-
ous reasons (good ones I think, as explained below), neither provides much detail 
in the way of carrying out step two. 
As to step one, Garber advances a theory of what might be called "limited logi-
cal omniscience." He begins with a truth-functional language L, with atomic sen-
tences a;, and builds language L * from L by adding new atomic sentences A f-B, 
where A and Bare any sentences of L (i.e., truth-functional compounds of the 
a;s). Treating sentences A f-B as atomic has the effect of making each of them 
formally, in L*, logically independent of all the other atomic sentences: L*-
atomic sentences neither L*-imply nor are L*-implied by other L*-atomic sen-
tences. Thus, there are no axiomatic constraints on what subjective probabilities 
(between 0 and 1) may be assigned to atomic sentences: any sprinkling of num-
bers between 0 and 1 (inclusive) on the atomic sentences is allowed. 
"Extrasystematically ,"however, we will want to understand" f-" as meaning, 
say, implies, or explains, and this makes it desirable to put some sort of formal 
constraint on the relation. Recall that step two of the basic Bayesian response to 
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the problem is to identify the appropriate logical relation that is discovered be-
tween T and E; "f-" is intended to be interpreted as denoting that appropriate re-
lation. Let us thus briefly digress from step one and consider Garber's treatment 
of step two. Garber doesn't actually insist on any particular interpretation of" f-". 
He states: 
Depending on the context of investigation, "f-" may be understood as truth-
functional implication, or implication in . . . the global language of science. 
We can even read "hi f-ei" as "ei is a positive instance of hi," or as "ei bootstrap 
confirms hi with respect to some appropriate theory," as Glymour demands. 
(1983, 112) 
I agree with Garber that it need not be part of an adequate solution to the problem 
Glymour has raised that a particular interpretation of" f-" be specified, i.e., that 
a particular logical relation between Tand Ebe described. For, as Garber sug-
gests, different interpretations of" f-" may be appropriate in different particular, 
actual cases of problem IIB2. What relation will be appropriate depends, as 
Garber suggests, on the context of investigation. Indeed, in different actual inves-
tigations, different relations (of the appropriate kind) between an E and a Twill 
be discovered, assuming that Garber's general approach to problem IIB2 parallels 
what transpires in actual cases of IIB2. Of course, the Bayesian defense would 
be strengthened if analyses of actual, historical cases of problem IIB2 could be 
given, supplying particular appropriate interpretations of" f-". For the most part, 
in any case, both Garber and Jeffrey use the interpretation of" f-" as "logically 
implies" to guide some of their intuitions and support various moves in their anal-
yses; hence, one would suppose, the symbolism. 
In any case, some formal constraint or other on f- would seem to be desirable, 
if plausible, given the more or less vague intended interpretation. Garber 
assumes: 
(K*) Pr(A & B & A f--B) = Pr(A & A f--B). 
This principle guarantees that if a person assigns subjective probability 1 to A and 
to A f--B, then this individual will also assign probability 1 to B. Thus, f- will 
behave somewhat like implication in classical Bayesianism, although, as Garber 
points out, K* by itself doesn't rule out its being interpreted as conjunction, for 
example, or biconditionalization. 
Garber distinguishes what he calls "global Bayesianism" from what he calls 
"local Bayesianism," and the distinction shows up when we look, extrasystemati-
cally, into the structures of the L*-atomic sentences a; and A f--B. As Garber ex-
plains, while these are atomic sentences of L *, they may, from a broader perspec-
tive, have complex logical structure: truth-functional structure, quantificational 
structure, modal logical structure, and so on-including of course a special in-
terpretation of" f-" in the case of the A f--Bs. In virtue of the internal structures 
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of the £*-atomic sentences, some of them may be logically true from such a 
broader perspective. Global Bayesianism includes the thesis that those that are 
logically true, whether from the broad perspective or just from the point of view 
of L *, must be assigned subjective probability 1. Local Bayesianism requires only 
that those that are logically true from the perspective of L * - i.e., those that are 
tautological truth-fanctional compounds of the a;s and the A f--Bs-be assigned 
subjective probability 1. (A similar argument applies to extrasystematically logi-
cally incompatible £*-atomic sentences.) 
Garber proposes that local Bayesianism can handle problem IIB2, since al-
though it may be true-even logically true-that Tf--E (when "f--" is inter-
preted), it is nevertheless allowable that Pr(Tf--E) < 1, so that it may also be 
the case that Pr( TIT f--E) > Pr(T). In cases of problem IIB2, according to 
Garber, it is Tf--E, and not E, that actually confirms T; and although Eis old, 
Tf--E may not be old, for "local Bayesians." 
I agree that Garber's defense does all that needs to be done in the way of carry-
ing out step two of the strategy, as explained above. However, there are serious 
problems with his approach to step one, as I shall argue in the next section. In 
addition to taking a more critical look at Garber's theory of local Bayesianism, 
I shall also in the next section examine the approach to a more realistic Bayesian-
ism offered by Hacking (1967). I then will try to characterize a more adequate 
kind of approach to step one (without, however, attempting actually to carry out 
such an approach). Finally, in section 5, I shall turn to step three of the strategy. 
4. Bayesianism and Logical Fallibility 
Although I sympathize with the idea that axioms of subjective probability the-
ory should be weakened to allow for the failure of logical omniscience in rational 
individuals, I think Garber's approach does not go nearly far enough in the way 
of allowing logical fallibility. To extend Garber's analogy, his method is to draw 
a "line" demarcating the "local" from the "nonlocal," and then to insist on logical 
omniscience only on the local side of the line. The line Garber draws (as an ex-
ample of the approach at least) is, so to speak, between truth-functional logic and 
logic that attends to more features of the logical form of statements than truth-
functional logic does. That is, Garber's approach requires rational locally Bayes-
ian agents to assign probability 1 to all tautologies (of L*), and to recognize all 
cases of pairs of sentences that are logically incompatible in virtue of their (L *) 
truth-functional logical structure (in the sense that the subjective probability of 
their disjunction will in each such case equal the sum of their subjective probabili-
ties). The same need not hold for cases of sentences (namely, some "atomic" sen-
tences of L *) that are logically true in virtue of non-truth-functional (or even per-
haps, as far as L* is concerned, "extrasystematic" truth-fanctional) features of 
214 Ellery Eells 
their form, or for pairs of sentences that are logically incompatible in virtue of 
(L*) non-truth-functional features of their forms. 
But this seems to be an inappropriate place to draw the relevant "line." For 
there are extremely complex tautologies (of L *), so complex that it would be more 
difficult to recognize them as logically true than to recognize as logically true cer-
tain simple sentences that are logically true in virtue of their (say) quantificational 
logical form. Simple sentences of the form "For all x, if Fx then Fx," would be 
atomic in L *. And it seems completely inappropriate not to require an agent to 
assign probability 1 to such sentences, while at the same time insisting that the 
agent assign probability 1 to arbitrarily complex tautologies of L *. 
Of course the choice of making L and L * truth-fanctional languages is just an 
example. They could instead be first-order languages, where sentences contain-
ing modal logical structure, second-order quantifiers, and so on, would be consid-
ered atomic. However, the same objection would apply to any such proposal: 
There will always be extremely complex logically true sentences of the local lan-
guage, and extremely simple logically true sentences "outside" the local language, 
where it will be inappropriate to insist on probability 1 for the former while not 
so insisting in the case of the latter. Thus, in one way, Garber's theory oflocal 
Bayesianism requires too much, and in another, too little. 3 
Of course there may be some atomic sentences ai of L* that, from an ex-
trasystematic point of view, are extremely truth-fanctionally complex. Some of 
these may be tautologies from the extrasystematic point of view. Local Bayesian-
ism does not require subjective probability 1 for them. But this seems arbitrary 
in view of the fact that local Bayesianism does require subjective probability 1 
for tautologies of L * that have exactly the same truth-fanctional form from the 
point of view of L* as extrasystematically extremely complex tautological£*-
atomic sentences have from the extrasystematic point of view. That is, an£*-
atomic sentence a; may be an extremely complex tautology from an ex-
trasystematic point of view, and have the same complex form from that point of 
view as a sentence A has from the point of view of L *. Yet local Bayesianism re-
quires subjective probability 1 for A and allows any subjective probability for a;. 
Suppose some evidence statement E and some theory Tare, extrasystemati-
cally, quite complex, but complex only with respect to the kind of logical form 
to which the local language is sensitive. As an example, let's say E and Tare quite 
complex truth-fanctionally, from the extrasystematic point of view. Suppose also 
that T truth-functionally implies E from the extrasystematic point of view. From 
the point of view of the local language, however, E, T, and Tf-E are all atomic. 
Suppose that we are in a case of problem IIB2, so that Pr(E) = 1. Now it must 
be true that Pr(Tf-E) < 1 if Garber's approach is to work. But it seems quite 
arbitrary to think that Pr(Tf-E) may be less than 1, while there are sentences 
A and B of the local language that have the same forms from the point of view 
of the local language as T and E have from the extrasystematic point of view, 
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respectively, so that Pr( A:) B) has to equal 1. In this case, T:) E has the same 
truth table from the extrasystematic point of view as A :) B has from the point of 
view of the local language! And if one assigns subjective probability 1 to the con-
ditional A:) B out of local logical omniscience- in virtue of having perceived the 
truth-functional logical connection between A and B-then it is hard to see why 
this individual would miss the (identical kind of) logical connection in the case 
of Tand E.4 
The point here, of course, is that Garber's local Bayesianism makes the 
prospects for successfully carrying out step three of the general strategy look very 
bleak. In the case described in the previous paragraph, for example, it seems very 
implausible that Pr(T I n-E) > Pr(T), if it is required that the agent be logically 
omniscient with respect to the parallel logical relations between A and B. 
It is worthwhile considering an alternative way of"drawing the line," advanced 
by Ian Hacking in his well-known article "Slightly More Realistic Personal Prob-
ability" (1967). Hacking first notes that the axioms of subjective probability the-
ory can be stated in terms of the idea of logical possibility, rather than the ideas 
oflogical truth and incompatibility. Thus, the usual axioms can be restated as fol-
lows (this is not the particular axiomatization considered by Hacking in his 
article): 
For all propositions A and B: 
(1) Pr(A) ;::::; O; 
(2) Pr(A) = 1, if not-A is not logically possible; and 
(3) Pr(AvB) = Pr(A) + Pr(B), if A&B is not logically possible. 
Hacking then suggests that it is unrealistic to assume these axioms for subjective 
probability, since it is unrealistic to assume that a rational agent will always be 
able to recognize cases oflogical possibility and logical impossibility as such. In-
stead, we should assume axioms stated in terms of personal possibility and sen-
tences, where a sentence (see below) is personally possible if the relevant in-
dividual does not know (in a special sense of"know ,"see below) that the sentence 
is false. Thus, a sentence is only required to have subjective probability 1 if it 
is known to be true (rather than: if it is logically true), and the probability of a 
disjunction is only required to have subjective probability equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of its disjuncts if it is known that the conjunction of the two disjuncts 
is false. 
The reason for stating the axioms in terms of sentences rather than proposi-
tions is that "proposition" is usually understood in such a way that "two logically 
equivalent propositions" are really the same proposition (Hacking 1967, 318, 
cites Carnap 1947, 27). Thus, it would be absurd to entertain the possibility that 
an agent knows one proposition but fails to know a different but logically equiva-
lent proposition. However, we want to allow the possibility that an agent can 
know one thing, but-in part because the agent does not know the relevant logical 
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equivalence- does not know a second thing that is logically equivalent to the first. 
So it is natural to say that what the agent knows to be true is one formulation of 
a proposition and what the agent fails to know to be true is a different but logically 
equivalent formulation of the same proposition. Thus, (unambiguous) sentences 
are a natural choice for the objects of personal probability, sentences that express 
propositions, in a personal language closed under the linguistic connectives of ne-
gation, conjunction, disjunction, and conditionalization, for example. (For 
presumably the same reason, Garber's theory of local Bayesianism is also formal-
ized in such a way that the objects of subjective probability are sentences-of for-
mal languages, in fact.) 
Hacking's special sense of knowledge-called "the examiner's view of 
knowledge" - is one in which certain traditional closure conditions for knowledge 
are explicitly rejected, e.g., "a man can know how to use modus ponens, can 
know that the rule is valid, can know p, and can know p:>q, and yet not know 
q, simply because he has not thought of putting them together" (1967, 319). It 
is clear that such closure conditions must fail, if we relax the classical assumption 
oflogical omniscience. Otherwise (for example), the agent must assign probabil-
ity 1 to all first-order logical truths if (roughly) probability 1 is assigned to all the 
axioms of a (complete) deductive calculus in which the only rule is modus ponens. 
I think Hacking's way of making subjective probability theory more 
realistic- of abandoning the assumption of logical omniscience-goes too far. 
The axioms are much too weak. However, one of the ways in which it has been 
argued that classical personalism - the classical axioms assuming logical 
omniscience - are reasonable is by way of "Dutch book arguments." And Hacking 
suggests a revised Dutch book argument to show the reasonableness of his weaker 
axioms. 
One of the ways in which it has been attempted to justify classical personalism 
is to prove that if a person's subjective probabilities do not satisfy the classical 
axioms, and if the person is willing to accept any bet whatsoever whose odds are 
determined in the natural way from the person's subjective probabilities, then it 
is possible for a clever betting opponent to offer bets, all acceptable to the agent, 
such that no matter which propositions bet on tum out to be true and which false, 
the agent is assured of a loss. 5 The clever betting opponent need know no more 
than the agent about matters of fact in order to identify a series of bets (called 
a "Dutch book"), each acceptable to such an agent, but that will assure a net loss 
to the agent. All that is necessary is that the opponent be able to detect the "inco-
herence" (violation of the classical axioms); then, using simple mathematical 
techniques, a Dutch book can be found. The ability to detect an incoherence re-
quires only logical and mathematical sophistication -and not knowledge of mat-
ters of fact. 
Hacking, however, wants to put knowledge of matters of fact and knowledge 
oflogical facts on a par, for the purpose ofassessing a person's rationality. 6 Thus, 
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Hacking suggests that an appropriate betting opponent for carrying out a Dutch 
book argument must be one who knows no more than the agent in the examiner's 
sense of knowledge. But this has the consequence that if the agent is unaware of 
an incoherence in his subjective probabilities, then so must be an appropriate bet-
ting opponent. But this means that a person will turn out to be rational in the 
Bayesian sense as long as the person is not aware of an incoherence. 
Put in other terms, if it is personally possible to you that no Dutch book can 
be made against you, then this must also be personally possible to any appropriate 
betting opponent, so that the opponent couldn't know of a Dutch book against you 
either. So it seems that Hacking's slightly more realistic personal probability re-
quires only that you not know that you're not coherent. But this seems to be too 
severe a weakening of classical personalism. 
Thus, while Garber's approach seems to require too much of a rational agent 
in one sense, and too little in another, Hacking's approach simply requires too 
little. Recall that the central idea behind all the difficulties raised for Garber's lo-
cal Bayesianism is that of complexity of sentences, logical relations, and infer-
ences. The counterexamples all suggested (roughly) either that "local Bayesian-
ism requires that the agent perceive such-and-such enormously complex logical 
fact," or that "local Bayesianism does not require the agent to perceive such-and-
such extremely simple logical fact." From this point of view, the problem with 
Hacking's slightly more realistic personalism is that it allows the agent to set the 
standard governing how complex a logical fact has to be in order for him not to 
be required to perceive it, and its implications, and yet still be considered to be 
rational on the theory. All this suggests, to borrow Garber's analogy again, that 
the appropriate place to "draw the line" between the logical facts an agent has to 
perceive and those that one need not perceive, in order to be considered rational, 
should correspond to the complexity of the facts on the two sides of the line. Or 
perhaps we should conceive of rationality as coming in (objective) degrees, cor-
responding to where the line in fact falls for particular agents. Although the de-
velopment of such a measure is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper, I think 
we have seen plenty of considerations indicating that, if such a measure could be 
defined, then it would be the appropriate tool for use in developing a version of 
Bayesianism that is truly more realistic than classical Bayesianism and yet at the 
same time still reasonably restrictive in the right way. 
5. The Evidential Significance of n-E 
I turn now to part three of the basic Bayesian defense - an argument to the 
effect that Pr(T I Tf-E) should be greater than Pr(T) before the discovery of 
Tf-E. The main thing Garber does in this connection is show that it is possible 
that Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T). That is, he proves that, under some fairly general 
conditions, there are probability functions such that Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T) (and 
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(K*) is satisfied). No argument is given that one's subjective probability function 
should satisfy this inequality in the relevant kind of situation, although Garber 
points out in a note (1983, 131) that the discovery of Tf-Ewill increase the prob-
ability of T if and only if the probability of Tf-E is higher given T than given 
not-T. Richard Jeffrey (1983), in the part of his article about the problem of old 
evidence, basically assumes the adequacy ofGarber's steps one and two, and, talc-
ing a hint from Garber's note, provides an argument for step three. 
Here is a simplified version of Jeffrey's main result. Jeffrey proves that 
Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T) if the following four conditions obtain: 
(1) Pr(E) = 1 and Pr(T) > O; 
(2) Pr(Tf-E) and Pr(Tf- - E) are both strictly between 0 and 1, and 
Pr(Tf-E & Tf- - E) = O; 
(3) Pr(T I Tf-E v Tf- - E) ~ Pr(T); and 
(4) Garber's condition (K*) (see above), in particular, Pr(T & Tf- -E) 
= Pr(T& -E & Tf--E). 1 
The proof of this version is simple. In view of (3), it suffices to establish 
Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T I Tf-E v Tf- - E), 
which, given (2), is true if and only if 
Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(Tf-E I Tf-E v Tf- - E)Pr(T I Tf-E) 
+ Pr(Tf- - E I Tf-E v Tf- - E)Pr(T I Tf- - E). 
(1), and an application of (4), implies that the second term on the right-hand side 
equals 0. (1) and (3) imply that the right-hand side is greater than 0, so that 
Pr(TI Tf-E) > 0. And (2) implies thatPr(Tf-E I Tf-Ev Tf--E) < 1, giving 
us the desired inequality. 
Let us consider the four conditions. Condition (1) is part of the specification 
of the problem (we assume, of course, that T initially enjoys some credence). 
Condition (2) is plausible in light of the agent's logical nonomniscience and the 
intended interpretation of" f-", as long as we assume that the agent fully believes 
that Tis not inconsistent. Condition (3) will be discussed below; and condition 
( 4) just specifies part of the intended interpretation of " f-". 
Condition (3) expresses the idea that ''your confidence in [1] would not be 
weakened by discovering that it implies something about [the relevant phenome-
non]" (Jeffrey, 1983, 150). Conversely, in order for (3) to be true, it must also 
be the case that your confidence in T would be weakened (or left unchanged) by 
the discovery that it does not imply either E or -E. There is, however, the intui-
tion that the more a hypothesis or theory implies (the "stronger" it is logically), 
the less chance it has of being true-an intuition that says more, I think, than just 
that the probability of a hypothesis can be no greater than propositions it implies. 
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And it seems odd that a theory should be disconfirmed just by the fact that it is 
silent on a certain issue. Here, given that T implies something about the relevant 
phenomenon, there is, of course, always the chance that it implies something false 
about it. Thus, in order for (3) to be true, we must be antecedently relatively more 
confident that, ifTimplies something (E or -E) about the relevant phenomenon, 
then it implies a truth about it (i.e., E), than we are that Twould imply a falsehood 
about it (i.e., - E). But this seems to run against the spirit of the idea of allowing 
the agent to be logically nonomniscient, as I shall presently explain. 
Condition (3) (in the presence of the other conditions) implies that: 
Pr<n-E> 
x Pr(T I Tf-E) ~ Pr(T). 
Pr(Tf-E) + Pr(Tf- - E) 
Suppose now that the agent is "so logically nonomniscient" that Pr(Tf-E) 
Pr(Tf- - E). This is not implausible if T and E are sufficiently complex in the 
right way. Now, given that Twas not designed just with the intention of explain-
ing E, Tmay already have been confirmed somewhat; say Pr(T) is equal to 0.6. 
In that case, it is clear from the last displayed inequality that it is impossible for 
condition (3) to be satisfied. Note also that the agent's having the same degree of 
confidence in Tf-E as in Tf- - E, while at the same time assigning probability 
1 to E, is not incompatible with (4), together with a high degree of confidence 
in T, for the agent's degree of confidence in Tf-E and in Tf- - E may be quite 
low. 
Thus, in order for (3) to be satisfied, the agent must either assign a high proba-
bility to Tf-E, compared with the probability assigned to Tf- - E, or have a 
relatively low degree of confidence in T-or both. When would we expect this 
to be true] To me, this disjunctive condition strongly suggests (though strictly 
speaking it doesn't imply) that Twas designed to explain E. This hypothesis 
would certainly explain why Pr(Tf-E) is much greater than Pr(Tf- - E), if it 
is: the agent thinks he is pretty good at coming up with theories that would, if 
true, explain things. And it would also explain a low initial degree of confidence 
in T: the theory hasn't been around very long and thus has not received indepen-
dent confirmation. But if Twas designed to explain E, then we have only a solu-
tion to problem IIBl, above, and not to IIB2. (Earlier it was noted that, for IIAl 
and IIBl situations, Tmay derive support from its explaining E, but not from E 
itself.) 
Regardless of whatever connection there may be between the disjunctive con-
dition just discussed and cases in which Twas invented with the intention of ex-
plaining E, we have seen that there is what would seem to be an important class 
of cases outside the scope of Jeffrey's approach, as further suggested below. 
Failure of condition (3) is, of course, compatible with Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T): 
it could be true that finding out merely that T implies something about the relevant 
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phenomenon (i.e., that it either implies E or implies - E) would decrease one's 
confidence in T, while finding out that Timplies a truth (i.e., E) about the relevant 
phenomenon would increase one's confidence in T. For example, one can imagine 
an investigator's having somehow hit upon the idea that Einstein's equations might 
have precise implications pertaining to the apparent orbit of Mercury, without hav-
ing actually gone through any calculations to determine what the precise implica-
tions might be; and the investigator might conceivably, pessimistically, think it 
unlikely that any such precise consequences of the equations would match the pre-
vious (in this hypothetical example) precise observations of the orbit. In this case, 
nevertheless, a match would, for this investigator, provide striking confirmation. 
More formally, note that conditions (1) and (4) above imply that Pr(T I Tf-
- E) = 0. Thus, Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T) if and only if 
(*) Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr[ - (Tf-E) & - [Tf- - E) I - (Tf-E)] 
x Pr[T I - (Tf-E) & - (Tf- - E)]. 
And it is clear that this relation may be satisfied even if Jeffrey's condition (3), 
which, given his others, is equivalent to 
(3 ') Pr(T I Tf-E v Tf- - E) > Pr[T I - (Tf-E) & - (Tf- - E)], 
is not. Clearly (when Jeffrey's other conditions are met), the left-hand side of(*) 
is greater than the left-hand side of (3 ') (see the derivation of this above), and 
the right-hand side of(*) is less than the right-hand side of (3 '), thus making (*) 
"easier to satisfy" than (3 '). And, as suggested in the last paragraph with an ex-
ample, it seems that there are genuine cases of confirmation involving old evi-
dence in which(*) holds but (3'), i.e., (3), does not. 
But how to "justify" (*)? Of course, we should not hope for a universal justi-
fication of(*), applicable in all cases of theories T and evidence statements E. 
For example, as Jeffrey points out, 
a purported theory of acupuncture that implies the true value of the gravita-
tional red shift would be undermined thereby: [for example,] its implying that 
is likely testimony to its implying everything, i.e., to its inconsistency. ( 14 7) 
Also, note that we are virtually "back to square one." Condition(*) is equivalent 
to Pr(T I Tf-E) > Pr(T), given Jeffrey's conditions (1) and (2) and Garber's 
(K*), all of which are quite plausible given the specification of our problem, given 
logical nonomniscience, and given the intended interpretation of "f-"! 
There are good reasons to think that there can be no single justification of(*); 
there are no "more primitive" assumptions that will justify (*) and be satisfied in 
all and only those situations in which Tf-E should be taken as confirming T. As 
Jeffrey's acupuncture/red shift example shows, whether or not there is a rational 
increase in confidence in T as a result of discovering that Tf-E will depend on 
what T and E are about, on the relationships between what Tis about and what 
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E is about, and on our background beliefs. And of course these relevant items 
differ quite a lot from case to case; we should not expect them to be amenable 
to one single, systematic, formal treatment in the form of "more primitive" as-
sumptions. 
The case is parallel, I think, to the Bayesian explication of "E confirms T." The 
explication is "Pr(T IE) > Pr(T)", thus taking into account one's background be-
liefs, codified in Pr. Any justification of a statement of the form "Pr(T I E) > 
Pr(T)" will have to work from more or less particular information about the rela-
tion between T, E, and one's background beliefs, such information as "T~E," 
or "Eis a positive instance of Twhere Tis subjectively probabilistically indepen-
dent of the relevant object's satisfying the antecedent of T," or "E bootstrap 
confirms Trelative to an appropriate theory," and so on. Such information as this 
pertains to particular cases, and no particular such piece of information will apply 
generally. 
Similarly, it seems to me, the Bayesian should simply explicate "T~E 
confirms T(relative to Pr)" as "Pr(T I T~E) > Pr(T)," without expecting there 
to be any single formal kind of justification of the latter for exactly the cases in 
which T~E should be taken as confirming T. Jeffrey's analysis will shed light 
in many cases; but in other cases, there may be other formal conditions, incom-
patible with his condition (3), that will imply Pr(T I T~E) > Pr(T). And it is 
conceivable that in other cases, it will be a formally "intractable" feature of Pr 
that the inequality holds; i.e., there is no simple, more primitive, relation holding 
between various items in virtue of which the inequality holds. 
This latter kind of possibility, is, incidentally, closely connected with part of 
the Bayesian rationale for appeal to subjective probability distributions in the first 
place. As Charles Chihara has put it, 
To take account of heterogeneous information and evidence obtained from a 
variety of sources, all of different degrees of reliability and relevance, as well 
as of intuitive hunches and even vague memories, the Bayesian theory pro-
vides us with a subjective "prior probability distribution," which functions as 
a sort of systematic summary of such items. (1981, 433) 
Of course, the prior probability distribution does not literally summarize the rele-
vant items (hence the phrase "sort of' in the quotation), but rather summarizes 
the effects that the agent's absorption of such items has on the evidential situation 
at hand-the point being, in part, that there may be no simple formal relation be-
tween the relevant items themselves, the expression of which would accomplish 
the same task. And it seems that in some cases, there will not even be any simpler 
subjective probabilistic relations between items that justify or explain why 
Pr(T I E) > Pr(T), or why Pr(T I T~E) > Pr(T). 
As in the case of step two of the basic Bayesian strategy, I think the best hope 
for step three is (at least for starters) in the analysis of concrete, particular, histori-
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cal cases of confirmation, which come complete with particular sets of background 
beliefs, particular theories, and evidence statements, and what they are about. 
Notes 
l. For more on Bayesian confirmation theory, and the Dutch book and decision theoretical ap-
proaches alluded to, and for further references, see, for example, Savage (1972), Jeffrey (1983), 
Hesse (1974), Chihara (1981), and Eells (1982). For criticisms, see, for example, Kennedy and Chi-
hara (1979), Kyburg (1983), and Glymour (1980). 
2. Note that to complete a classification of situations in which an E can confirm a T, we would 
have to add the case of "New New Evidence": the case in which Eis new relative to the theory T (i.e., 
learned after Tis formulated), and in which we are presently at, or just subsequent to, the moment 
of the discovery of E. Of course, this situation does not present a problem for Bayesian confirmation 
theory of the kind under discussion. For, as required by the theory, if E actually confirms T, then 
E increases our confidence in Tat the time of Es discovery, the time specified in the description of 
this kind of situation. It is, of course, central to Bayesian confirmation theory that confirmation of 
a hypothesis or theory implies "rational increase in confidence" in the hypothesis or theory, given 
one's background beliefs (full and partial), which are supposed to be systematically codified in a sub-
jective probability (degree of confidence) function. Current controversy concerning the idea that con-
firmation coincides with confidence increase involves, I think, mainly (I) Glymour's problem of old 
evidence and (2) the plausibility of Glymour's (1980) "bootstrap" conception of evidence, which 
seems to be inconsistent with the idea of confirmation's implying increase in confidence. As to (I), 
that problem, and the possibility of a Bayesian resolution to it, is the focus of this paper. As to (2), 
see Horwich (1983) for discussion. 
3. Martin Barrett made essentially these points in my seminar on confirmation theory. 
4. Garber doesn't require what he calls condition(*), that Pr(A~B) = l if A:>B is a tautology 
of L* and must thus itself be assigned subjective probability l. This leaves open the possibility that 
even though locally Bayesian agents assign probability 1 to all tautologies, they may do so, even in 
the infinity of complex cases, on grounds other than a perception (intuitive or otherwise) of truth-
functional logical structure. But how might this possibility "realistically" be realized (even setting 
aside the implausibility of assigning probability 1 to all tautologies of L *? Surely we cannot suppose 
that, for example, for very many cases of tautological conditionals, their probability 1 status is se-
cured by the agent's being told by a source believed to be totally reliable that they are true. Garber 
acknowledges "a kind of informal contradiction in requiring that S be certain of A:> B when A truth-
functionally entails Bin [L*], while at the same time allowing him to be uncertain of A~B" (p. 118), 
while at the same time insisting (correctly) that this is no formal contradiction. Despite the intuitive 
implausibility of failure of(*) given that all tautologies must have subjective probability 1, Garber 
seems, in the end, neutral (or noncommittal), with respect to the condition (118). 
5. For details on the Dutch book argument, originally due to de Finetti (1964), see, for example, 
Shimony (1955), Kemeny (1955), or Skyrms (1984, chapter 2). 
6. Indeed, Hacking has emphasized (1967, 312-13), plausibly I think, the appropriateness of in-
vestigating certain logical and mathematical issues by empirical methods. Though not cited by Hack-
ing, one plausible example of this is the question of which of a number of blackjack ("21 ") strategies 
yields a player the highest expectation against the house, which plays a fixed strategy. Though mathe-
matically intractable, Monte Carlo techniques using computer simulation have been successfully em-
ployed. The point is that questions pertaining to how one can "in principle" come to know such-and-
such are irrelevant to rationality and confirmation, where what is relevant is what one in fact knows, 
and the reliability and efficiency of one's actual methods of coming to know such-and-such, given 
one's background belief and knowledge. 
7. In Jeffrey's version, E is contrasted not just with - E but is, more generally, a member of a 
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set of mutually exclusive propositions about some phenomenon, such as the tides. The version just 
given, however, would seem to be an instance of this, since if Eis about some phenomenon, then 
-E would seem to be about the same phenomenon. Also, Jeffrey uses "If' rather than "T." 
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